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Abstract. We study an agency model in which voters learn about both an incumbent and
an opponent. They observe the incumbent’s policy record and update their beliefs about
his opponent via a campaign. Although the former is relatively more informative, it can be
costly for the voter to learn about the incumbent from her policy record. This is because
policy reforms, that allow a voter to learn an incumbent’s ability, are risky and so can leave
the voter worse off. Then the voter may prefer that the incumbent takes safer actions. The
efficient level of reform–the one preferred by the voter–balances the value of learning with the
expected policy cost/benefits. In a world where the opponent’s campaign is uninformative
reform can be too low. This is due to the incumbent’s fear of failure. Or, it can be too
high: the incumbent gambles on success. We show that the presence of an opponent that
can reveal information via a campaign exacerbates these inefficiencies. An incumbent who
anticipates the effect of an opponent’s campaign on voter beliefs is more likely to make
inefficient policy choices. Further, such campaigns can lead to an overall welfare loss. This
is so when they do not reveal much about the opponent’s ability and yet have an impact on
the incumbent’s policy choice.
Keywords. incumbent vs. opponent, policy experimentation, accountability, informa-
tive campaigns
∗We thank Scott Ashworth, Steve Callander, Georgy Egorov, Francesco Giovonnoni, Jean Guillaume Forand, Stu-
art Jordan, Navin Kartik, Mik Laver, Ben Lockwood, Pablo Montagnes, David Myatt, Ken Shepsle, Jim Snyder,
Francesco Squintani, and seminar audience members at Berkeley, Bristol, Columbia University, the Harris School of
Public Policy, the Higher School of Economics in Moscow, Mannheim, NYU, Princeton, Stanford GSB, Warwick, and
participants at the Annual Meetings of the American Political Science Association, the II Workshop on Institutions,
Individual Behavior and Economic Outcomes in Alghero, and the Midwest Political Science Association.
1
21. Introduction
Most formal models of electoral competition assume perfect symmetry between candidates and
so do not consider the different roles played by an incumbent and his opponent. They may even
systematically ignore the impact of the latter. In the standard spatial model, prospective voters
compare the policy programmes of candidates but do not account for the incumbent’s past per-
formance. In agency models, voters form expectations based on the incumbent’s past performance
but do not learn about his opponent.1 In this paper, we develop a new agency model in order to
study the interplay between an incumbent and an opponent that incorporates critical aspects of
the asymmetric relationship between them.
Central to our model is the fact that voters beliefs about both an incumbent and his opponent
depend upon observations of their performance. The idea that voters update their beliefs based
on observations of opposition performance is supported by anecdotal evidence. Consider data from
the 2010 UK General Election that is illustrated in Figure 1. Voters’ perceptions of the best choice
of Prime Minister were stable until the dissolution of parliament and the start of the campaign
on April 12. Thereafter there was a sharp increase in the percentage of voters supporting Nick
Clegg, the leader of the Liberal Democrats (who then went on to become Deputy Prime Minister).
Correspondingly, there was a sharp decrease in the percentage of “don’t knows.” This perception
continued through the time of the first televised debate between the party leaders: 27 percent of
voters believed that Clegg would make the best Prime Minister two days after the first televised
debate, up from 12 percent in the same poll taken five days earlier. Again, this corresponded with
a sharp decline in the percentage of “don’t knows’. The evidence suggests that Cleggs’s campaign
influenced respondents beliefs about his suitability to be Prime Minister. Indeed, by the time of
the second televised debate more people thought him to be a better choice than the incumbent
Gordon Brown. This change in attitude occurred despite Clegg’s lack of executive experience. More
generally, we surmise that successful campaigns can lead to an increase in a candidate’s perceived
executive competence, whereas unsuccessful ones can have the opposite effect.
These data also illustrate a second aspect of our model. Although the campaign appeared to have
an effect on previously undecided voters (who now favoured Clegg), it had no apparent effect on
evaluations of the incumbent. This is perhaps unsurprising. After all, by the time of the campaign,
voters had already learned about the incumbent from his performance in office. This suggests that
1See recent articles by Dewan and Shepsle (2011) and Ashworth (2012) for a review of the agency and spatial modeling
approach to elections.
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Figure 1. Voters’ Perceptions of the Best Choice of PM, UK General Election 2010.
voters learn using role-specific technologies. The point is nicely made by Bawn and Somer-Topcu
(2012) who argue that “voters can evaluate government parties on the basis of recent performance,
but they must judge opposition parties on the basis of rhetoric and conjecture.”2
In this paper, we develop and analyse a model that builds on these insights. Here, voters learn
about an incumbent from his track record and about the opponent from his campaign. We make the
plausible assumption that an incumbent’s track record is more informative about his competence
than is a campaign about that of his opponent.
We use our model to explore the policy implications of this asymmetry. Despite a commonly held
view that campaign talk is cheap, anecdotal evidence suggests a link between opposition campaigns
and incumbent policy. In the United Kingdom, for example, respective Labour (Conservative)
incumbent governments have adopted opposition policies announced during the campaign. There
are different mechanisms that could explain this link (perhaps these politicians have information
that such policies are popular, or have become convinced of their merits). However, systematic
evidence from Adams and Somer-Topcu (2009) suggests that policy proposals of governing and
opposition parties are consistent with a best-response logic. Correspondingly, we study the strategic
interaction between incumbent, opponent and voters in order to assess its policy implications.
2Indeed, the difference in the technology available to an incumbent and his opponent has been used to explain the
empirical regularity that campaign resources translate into higher vote shares for the latter but not the former (e.g.
Jacobson (1978)).
4In our model voters learn about the incumbent by observing policy outcomes associated with his
decisions. Specifically, an incumbent chooses whether to implement a project or a policy reform
that is successful if and only if he is competent enough to implement it; otherwise, it results in
failure. Rather than take such “risks” the incumbent can, if he chooses, play it “safe” by doing
nothing or sticking with existing policy. In this case nothing can be inferred about his competence.
We first explore the incumbent’s choice when a voter has no information about the opponent (as in
the canonical model). We then analyse the incumbent’s choice when anticipating that the opponent
can reveal information about his (the opponent’s) abilities via a campaign.
We ask whether politician’s incentives to invest in risky policies are aligned with the social returns.
The efficient level of reform-the one preferred by the voter-balances the value of learning with the
expected policy cost/benefits. We note that even negative policy outcomes (or blunders) have social
value due to learning: Succesful or unsuccesful execution of a risky policy is positively correlated
with outcomes of policy experiments in the future. Despite this we show that (relative to an efficient
benchmark) when the opponent can not reveal information via his campaign, levels of risk taking
can be too low. Our analysis agree with arguments made by Harford who highlights differences in
risk-taking across sectors.3 In the business world, he argues, success is built on previous failure,
whereas,“in politics where are the bad ideas that have been tested, found wanting, and replaced
with something better?” Our model relates such under-investment in risk to electoral accountability
and the “fear of failure” that is induced by the winner take all nature of electoral competition.
Perhaps surprisingly, however, we show that the electoral accountability can also lead to over-
investment in reform in equilibrium. When subject to election an incumbent may be too willing
to take the risky option. That is, he implements reforms that on balance do not benefit the voter.
We label this effect “gambling on success.”
To illustrate, consider the case of an incumbent who chooses whether to build a public project
like a bridge or a major exhibition centre. The voter and incumbent agree on the value of such a
project (neither is ideologically committed to it). Suppose that voters learn something about the
incumbent’s ability from execution of this project and believe it to be (positively) correlated with
his ability to implement other policies. Suppose further that when taking the expected returns
into account the voter is not in favour of the project. The incumbent might accede to the voter’s
wishes. Should he do so, however, then the voter will be unable to distinguish between him and his
3see http://www.freakonomics.com/2011/05/10/why-is-failure-a-sign-of-a-healthy-economy
5opponent. By contrast, if the incumbent builds the bridge and is successful, a sequentially rational
voter will retain him. And so, anticipating this, the incumbent builds the bridge.
Beyond our parable, recently gathered empirical evidence suggests that learning may indeed drive
over-investment in public projects. Voigtlander and Voth (2014) study the electoral benefits of
the world’s first nationwide highway network built by the Nazis. They show that the German
Autobahn, “a canonical case of public infrastructure development,” contributed to Nazi electoral
success and to the perception of the regime’s competence, despite the fact that neither the economic
or military case for road development was well developed.4
Other policy interventions illustrate the notion of “gambling on success.” As an example, consider
British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher’s decision to send a task force to the Falkland Islands in
1982. The islands were populated by 1800 British subjects and under occupation by Argentinian
forces. During hostilities 900 people, including 255 British military personnel, lost their lives. The
war cost the exchequer around 3 billion pounds. At the outset, only the most hawkish, such as
Admiral Sir Henry Leach head of the Navy, gave the task force much chance. Ex ante the choice
of war could not be justified. The rest is history. As noted by David Cannadine in his obituary to
Thatcher: “She gambled everything on getting back the Falkland Islands from Argentina, and she
scored a spectacular triumph. But it was a close-run thing: If she had lost she would have been
the most derided British Prime Minister since Anthony Eden.”5
Our analysis shows that the incumbent places either too little weight on learning relative to the
social return (“fear of failure”), or too much (“gambling on success”). In both cases such under/over
investment is driven by the incumbent’s concern for his career and subsequent election. Our key
question is: What effect do opposition campaigns have on the incumbent’s policy? Moving beyond
our baseline model we explore a world where, as in our motivating example, voters can update
their beliefs about an opponent on the basis of his campaign. A conjecture is that access to
such information should realign incumbent’s incentives. This is not the case, however. Far from
realigning the incumbents incentives with those of voters, we show that opponents campaigns can
exacerbate problems of “fear of failure” and “gambling on success.” That is, policy reform will
4Comparing constituency level differences in Nazi support between the 1933 parliamentary elections and the 1934
plebiscite, the authors find that opposition to the Nazis was lower in areas where the autobahn had been built. In
making the case that highway construction enhanced the Nazi’s reputation for competence, they dismiss alternative
explanations: The economic rational for the autobahn was unclear as “car ownership rates in Germany in 1933 were
low, approximately one quarter of those in England or France;” few made use of the new autobahns and road-building
was a weak aspect of demand-stimulus in post-Weimar Germany; though road building delivered local benefits in the
form of employment, “areas with high unemployment did not show a greater increase in Nazi support when roads
were built;” finally, the Nazis had no particular ideological conviction in favor of road-building.
5How Should we Rank Margaret Thatcher? New York Times, April 14th, 2013.
6always be either too high or too low relative to the efficient benchmark. Moreover, comparing cases
reveals that when the voter is unable to learn about the opponent policy the resulting policy is
more in line with her wishes.
Performing a fuller welfare analysis, we consider a voter’s ability to make more informed choices
under asymmetric competition and its policy implications. We show, surprisingly, that such com-
petition can have negative overall consequences. These relative welfare losses arise precisely when
the information gleaned about executive ability from an opponent’s campaign is small, though
sufficient to affect the incumbent’s incentives.
Our paper is organized as follows: After discussing related literature, we introduce our model and
benchmark results with an the opponent who is a random draw from a known distribution. Our
main results, with an active opponent, then follow. Finally, in the appendix, we perform several
robustness checks: we analyse voters who can commit to the use of their optimal retention strategies
within the class of equilibrium strategies, focus on specific fixed rules that are akin to voter biases
in favor of (or against) the incumbent, and relax other core assumptions. These different model
specifications yield results that are qualitatively similar to those obtained in our core model.
2. Related Literature
We explore learning in the context of the multi-armed bandit model, used in policy analysis by
Aghion, Bolton, Harris, and Julien (1991), developed further by Banks and Sundaram (1993) Banks
and Sundaram (1998), and adapted by Strumpf (2002) to look at policy innovation and its relation
to government decentralization and by Strulovici (2010) to analyse experimentation by groups of
decision makers. Our focus on electoral competition relates most closely to Banks and Sundaram
(1990); they analyse an infinite armed bandit problem where a principal selects a candidate with
a single action that yields a reward (to the principal) according to the agent’s type. In a recent
contribution Hirsch (2011) analyses learning where the principal and agent share the same intrinsic
motivation but have potentially different preferred policy instruments. The policy environment in
our model is closest to that used by Lizzeri and Persico (2009) who study the impact of different
electoral systems on risk control. In our model, elections allow for learning about an incumbent’s
type via her policy choice. Others focus on learning about policy: Volden, Ting, and Carpenter
(2008) analyse a situation where governments learn from their experiences and those of other
governments; Callander (2011a) looks at learning by trial and error in a business environment,
Callander (2011b) explores elections, and Callander (2008) investigates learning in bureaucracies.
7The novelty in our model is the role played by an opponent. This aspect relates our work to
Ashworth and Shotts (2011) where an incumbent engages in costly information acquisition before
choosing a policy. The role of the challenger is to assess and criticize the incumbent’s platform that
also depends on information acquisition. When the opponent’s claims are verifiable, the incumbent
exerts more effort and so challengers improve welfare. Our focus is on adverse selection where
voters learn about the incumbent’s type (competence) rather than the correctness of her decision.
In our model, the incumbent and opponent have access to different technologies by which they con-
vince voters of their competence. The assumption builds on a vast literature that highlights that
the translation of campaign resources into votes is much higher for opponents than incumbents.
In a related model, Daley and Snowberg (2011) look at the constrained choice of an incumbent
between a safe and a risky option in a multi-task model. They show that the optimal allocation of
resources by a high-quality incumbent does not maximize voter welfare (campaigning is too high),
though the voter cannot commit to disregarding information that campaigns convey. Our contri-
bution is to model the interaction between competing politicians with different technologies.6 In
our model, voters cannot commit to ignoring information from the opponent’s campaign and this
induces a higher-than-optimal level of reform by the incumbent. Over-reform due to competitive
interaction in a campaign between politicians is also a feature in Prato and Wolton (2014). Relat-
edly, Bektimirov and Montagnes (2014) extend the classic model of electoral accountability (Barro
(1973) and Ferejohn (1986)) to explore aspects of a specific set of reforms, namely privatisation.
Our analysis reveals inefficiencies that arise due to incumbents’ career concerns. This relates our
model to the literature on “pandering” where informed politicians implement populist choices
that do not benefit voters (Canes-Wrone, Herron, and Shotts, 2001; Maskin and Tirole, 2004).
Extensions of this framework look at different aspects of elections and constitutional design (Fox,
2007; Fox and Stephenson, 2011). While these models incorporate policy differences, office-seeking
concerns and asymmetric information, one of our contributions is to show that similar inefficiencies
arise even with symmetric information and shared preferences: the career concerns of the incumbent
are sufficient for him to implement an inefficient level of reform. We relate such inefficiencies to
information about an opponent and so contributes to the analysis of accountability where voters
have access to multiple information sources. In Ashworth and Shotts (2010) the media comments
on incumbent policy and this can attenuate or exaggerate populist pandering.
6Relatedly Gul and Pessendorfer (2014) analyze electoral competition with asymmetric access to campaign funds.
83. A Model of Learning and Elections
We develop an agency model in which an incumbent politician of an unknown type takes one of two
possible actions in each of two periods. As in the standard agency model, a voter can learn about the
incumbent’s type by her first period action and has the option of either retaining him or replacing
him with an alternative. Our key innovation is in modeling the strategic interaction between the
first period incumbent and her opponent. Specifically we model the strategic interaction between
two politicians j ∈ {i, o}, where i is the incumbent at the beginning of the game and o her opponent;
and a representative voter who chooses between them according to their perceived ability. Neither
the voter nor the politicians know the ability of the latter prior to any actions taken.
In each of two periods, one of two policies can be adopted: the first is a “safe” policy; whilst the
second is “risky”. To illustrate we can think of the risky policy as being the implementation of a
type of reform, whilst the safe policy involves sticking with the status quo. One example is where
the first period salient issue is whether to implement budget reforms or not. In the second, it is
whether to implement constitutional reform. The absence of reform entails the current budget and
constitutional arrangements remaining in place. The outcome from implementation of the risky
policy can either be a success or a failure. The determining factor in this outcome is the competence
of the politician at implementing such a policy. The first period policy reform is successful if the
incumbent has the requisite skills to execute it. And the same is true of the second period reform.
Competence across risky policies is positively correlated. This implies that a success or failure
in the first period is informative about the incumbent’s competence in period 2’s risky task. A
successful outcome of a risky policy is always beneficial to the voter and the politician implementing
it, relative to the payoff from the status quo.
The innovation in our model is the introduction of an active opponent in the first period. After the
incumbent has taken her first period action and the outcome is revealed, the opponent launches a
campaign that has no direct cost attached. As with the policy choice of the incumbent, a campaign
can be either safe or risky. An example of a safe campaign is where the opponent emphasizes
values, such as patriotism or the need for a strong economy, that are broadly shared, though does
not provide detailed policy prescriptions. We think of such a campaign as safe as it is unlikely
to have a strong impact, either positive or negative, on how the voter perceives her competence
for office. A risky campaign, by contrast, is one where the opponent provides detailed policy
alternatives or a strong criticism of the incumbent’s record. Such a campaign is more revealing in
that it showcases her ability to plan policy effectively and to communicate clearly. A risky campaign
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Figure 2. Timeline
is successful in that the opponent is able to make the case for reform or launch a successful attack
on the incumbent, otherwise it ends in failure. As with the incumbent, the determining factor
in a successful campaign is the competence of the politician. Once again we assume that being
competent at running a campaign is positively correlated with competence in period 2’s risky task.
After the outcome of the opponent’s campaign is revealed the voter chooses whether to retain the
incumbent or not.
Figure 2. describes the time-line of the game. The incumbent chooses the first period policy.
If he has chosen the risky policy the voter learns whether it has been a success or failure. The
opponent then chooses his campaign strategy and the voter learns (if he has chosen risky) about his
executive ability. Voters then evaluate both incumbent and challenger before electing one or other
in a winner-take-all contest. The winner of this contest then implements the second period policy
and the game ends. In what follows we focus on the Perfect Bayesian Equilibria of this game.
A sequentially rational voter cares about her expected second period payoff. She benefits from
implementation of the second period reform only if it is implemented by a competent politician.
Her posterior beliefs, based on her first period observations in each of the relevant subgames,
determine her optimal retention rule. The voter’s concern is the correlation between successful first
period performance and the successful implementation of the second period reform. Whilst some
skills, such as the effective consultation, communication, and orchestration of a bill through the
legislative chamber, are required for successful implementation of all reforms, others require specific
skills. This observation suggests a positive albeit imperfect correlation between the incumbent’s
competence in both periods. Similarly, successful campaigning by the opponent also involves skills,
such as effective policy planning and communication, that are relevant but imperfectly correlated
with the ability to successfully implement reform in period 2.
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To formalize the idea of task-and-period-specific qualities, we assume that the type of a politician
j in period t is θtj ∈ {0, 1}. When θtj = 1, the politician is competent and so successful when taking
the risky action in period t. When θtj = 0 she is not. For notational simplicity, but without loss of
generality, we assume that the politician’s competence is perfectly correlated with the outcome of
the risky action.7 The prior probability that a politician is competent on any task is p.
Our assumption that the incumbent’s competence across periods is positively correlated then leads
to the following specification for the voter’s beliefs
Pr{θ2i = 1 | θ1i = 1} = pH > p = Pr{θ2i = 1}
Pr{θ2i = 1 | θ1i = 0} = pL < p = Pr{θ2i = 1}.
If the incumbent implements the safe policy then the prior assumption about his competence with
respect to the second period policy is unaffected. The posterior probability that the incumbent
is competent in the implementation of the second period reform is greater when running on a
successful record of implementing reform (pH > p). It is smaller when he runs on a record of
previous failure (pL < p).
A successful campaign shows that the opponent can plan and communicate policy. As discussed
above, this also makes it more likely that he will successfully deliver the reform policy should he
be elected and choose to do so. Incorporating this assumption we then have that
Pr{θ2o = 1 | θ1o = 1} = ph > p = Pr{θ2o = 1}
Pr{θ2o = 1 | θ1o = 0} = pl < p = Pr{θ2o = 1}.
When the opponent runs a safe campaign the voter’s prior is unaffected. The posterior probability
that the opponent is competent to implement the reform is higher when he has showcased her
ability in the campaign. And lower when he was unsuccessful at running the risky campaign. Our
setup draws attention to an interesting aspect of electoral competition, namely the ability of the
opponent to influence the voter’s perception of his ability via his endogenous choice of campaign.
We assume that information revealed during the course of the campaign is less informative than
that obtained from observing the incumbent’s track-record: Formally, pL < pl < p < ph < pH .8
Given these beliefs, it is straightforward to describe the sequentially rational actions of the voter in
each of the relevant subgames. In several subgames, the action of the opponent is irrelevant: The
7For our results to hold we simply need to assume that the probability of a successful risky policy is strictly greater
when θt = 1 than when θt = 0.
8In the Appendix we derive these inequalities from the fact that the voter learns more from the track-record than
the campaigns.
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voter always retains an incumbent who successfully implements reform irrespective of the opponent’s
action, and she never retains one who fails when implementing reform.9 In the remaining subgames,
however, the actions of the opponent will influence her decision. When the incumbent plays safe,
a risky campaign can determine the election outcome: If the opponent succeeds the voter replaces
the incumbent; if he fails, she does not. Finally, when both play safe then the voter is strictly
indifferent between retaining the incumbent or not. As we shall see, our results are robust to
assuming different reelection rates in this case.
Table 1 summarizes the sequentially rational retention rule that is implemented by the voter in
each of the subgames where she takes an action. For most of our analysis we assume that when
the voter has no information form the incumbents record or from his opponent then she reelects
the former with fixed probability x ∈ (0, 1) though to illustrate some of our results we set x = 1/2.
However, later on when checking the robustness of our main results, we allow for the endogenous
choice of x. Our design is one in which the role of the opponent is limited due to the relatively
weak technology available to him. Nevertheless, as we shall see, outcomes are markedly different
in a world where the opponent can reveal information about himself via his campaign strategy.
Opposition
safe success in failure in
Incumbent campaign risky campaign risky campaign
safe policy x 0 1
success in risky policy 1 1 1
failure in risky policy 0 0 0
Table 1. Probability of reelecting the incumbent
Finally, we complete the specification of payoffs. Implementation of the status quo yields a payoff
of 1 to the politician implementing it and to the voter. A successful reform yields payoff r > 1 to
both. A failed reform, however, yields a payoff of 0. The key difference between the politicians and
the voter is that the former obtain a positive payoff only when they implement the policy. Thus,
the second period payoff of a former incumbent removed from office, or that of an opponent who is
not elected, is zero.
9To simplify, we assume that the voter elects the candidate with the highest posterior probability of being competent
(with respect to policy implementation in period 2). While this is the optimal course of action for a sequentially
rational voter, in some circumstances she might be indifferent between her choices(e.g. when the opponent plays safe
and the incumbent has been unsuccessful thus yielding an expected payoff of 1 in period 2). All of our results are,
however, robust to relaxing this convenient assumption.
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4. Noninformative Campaigns
We begin our analysis by focusing on the case where the opponent’s action is not relevant to the
voter’s choice. This is so when his campaign provides no information about his competence for
office. The voter then believes him to be competent with prior probability p. In this context, it is
useful to establish the efficient outcome: the policy choice of the incumbent that maximizes voter
utility. If the incumbent chooses safe then he learns nothing and so implements safe again in the
next period (yielding a total payoff of 2). Playing risky allows him to learn his competence with
respect to the first period reform and so update his beliefs that he is competent when implementing
the second period policy. Straightforwardly, an incumbent who maximizes voter welfare plays:
risky in period 1⇔ p(r + max{1, pHr}) + (1− p) > 2. (1)
A simple calculation provides the following result:
Lemma 1. An incumbent who maximizes voter welfare implements the risky policy in period 1
when pr > 1+p
1+pH
and pHr > 1 and plays safe otherwise.
The efficient policy choice balances the voter’s objectives: she wants the successful implementation
of reforms and to learn about the incumbent’s competence. An interesting feature is that, from the
voter’s perspective, reform is desirable even though its expected payoff is less than that obtained
when playing safe (pr < 1). This highlights the importance of learning. An incumbent who chooses
the risky policy in the first period and is successful will do so again in the second period. Learning
about the incumbent’s type can improve the voter’s expected payoff.
Comparative static analysis is straightforward. An increase in the correlation in task-specific com-
petencies increases the value of first period learning: Fixing r, a welfare maximizing incumbent
engages in more first period risk-taking for larger pH . Fixing pH , the incumbent engages in more
risk-taking when the policy payoff conditional on success is larger. As a result, beneficial reforms
(large r) are implemented more often.
Next, we consider the actions of an incumbent who is concerned with retaining office rather than
maximizing voter welfare. His career concern may lead him to distort his behavior. The voter
has a blunt tool, namely her retention rule, that she uses to realign the incumbent’s incentives.
Straightforwardly, given her beliefs, the voter retains an incumbent who successfully implements
first period reform and replaces one who tries but is unsuccessful. However, when the incumbent
13
plays safe the voter is strictly indifferent between her strategies and so adopts her fixed retention
rule x ∈ (0, 1). Given this retention rule, an incumbent who cares about maintaining office plays
risky in period 1⇔ p(r + max{1, pHr}) > 1 + x. (2)
Figure 3 provides a graphical illustration of this strategy for the most intuitive rule x = 1/2.10 The
45◦ (dotted) line defines pr = 1 where expected returns from safe and risky are equal. Above this
line, the first period expected payoffs from choosing risky are lower than those from choosing safe.
Two more curves are depicted. The dashed curve illustrates the efficient choice: to its right the
voter wants the incumbent to take risks and to its left to play safe. The solid curve separates the
parameter space according to the incumbent’s equilibrium actions: to its right she chooses risky,
to its left she plays safe; and it cuts the efficiency curve from below just once. A clear implication
is that the level of risk is either too high (at high p) or too low (at low p) relative to the efficient
benchmark.
gamble on success
fear of failure
1
r
p
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Figure 3. Equilibrium with a Noninformative Campaign and x = 1/2.
At low levels of competence the politician under-invests in the reform policy relative to the efficient
benchmark established in Lemma 1. She fears that the risky action will result in failure and loss
of reputation compounded by loss of office. We refer to this effect as a “fear of failure” that may
lead to inefficiently low levels of reform. At high levels of competence, by contrast, the politician
10In the figure we consider pH = p0.3.
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will over-invest in the risky policy relative to the efficient benchmark. In these situations, although
on average the incumbent’s competence is high, the value of the risky option is relatively low.
While voters would rather she play safe, the incumbent anticipates success when implementing
reform. Moreover, a (sequentially rational) voter will then reelect her. Thus the incumbent has an
incentive to take inefficient risks. We refer to this incentive as “gambling on success”. These effects
are labeled in the appropriate parameter regions in Figure 3.
Both effects (“fear of failure” and “gambling on success”) stem from the incumbent’s career con-
cern. His probability of retaining office following implementation of reform depends upon the voters
posterior beliefs. When successfully implementing reform, these jump from p to pH and the incum-
bent is sure to be elected. When the incumbent is unsuccessful, by contrast, the voter’s posterior
decreases from p to pL. In this equilibrium, the incumbent places too much weight on the impact
of the policy outcome on voter beliefs (and hence her reelection probability). Correspondingly, he
places insufficient weight on the benefits of policy.
We note that for the specific values of pL and pH under investment occurs in the risky policy occurs
for p < 1/2, whereas investment is too high for p > 1/2. We end this section by showing that this
is true whenever x = 1/2 and, moreover, that our insights extend to a situation with any arbitrary
x. An interpretation is that for x > 1/2 a voter has a systematic bias in favor of the incumbent:
although she believes both politicians to be of the same competence she favours the incumbent–this
is a form of incumbency advantage. By contrast if x < 1/2 then she biases in favor of the opponent:
a form of incumbency disadvantage.
Proposition 1. When campaigns are uninformative (ph = p) about the opponent’s competence and
the voter reelects the incumbent with probability x ∈ (0, 1) then the incumbent under-invests in the
risky policy (fear of failure) for p < x and overinvests gambling on success for p > x.
5. Informative Campaigns
Next we consider the impact of a campaigns by political opponents that may influence voter’s
perceptions about their competence. We study a world where such information, while relevant to
the voter’s choice, is less informative than that obtained via the track record of the incumbent
(specifically, p < ph < pH). Following our earlier line of enquiry, we ask: what is is the effect of an
opponent’s campaign on the efficient level of risk taking by the incumbent? We then explore the
equilibrium level of risk taking with an active opponent.
In dealing with the first question we find the following:
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Proposition 2. For any value x ∈ (0, 1), and although a voter prefers less risk taking when
campaigns are informative, the incumbent is more likely to implement the risky policy.
The first part of the result follows from the fact that the opponent’s campaign provides a costless
source of information. Therefore, quite naturally, the (marginal) benefit from learning about the
incumbent through implementation of the risky policy is lower than when campaigns are uninfor-
mative. As a consequence the voter prefers less risk taking.
The second part of the result stems from the incumbent’s career concern. To demonstrate, consider
again our “bridge-building” parable. In that parable the incumbent could impress a voter by
successfully executing construction of a bridge. Now add an opponent to the mix. His campaign
might impress the voter. Specifically it might her persuade her that his executive ability is higher
than her prior would suggest. This has an effect on the incumbent’s incentives: anticipating an
opponent’s campaign makes it more likely that the incumbent uses risky policies in order to inform
the voter of his executive ability. A key insight is that information about an opponent, that allows
voters to make more informed choices, can have an indirect effect on the policy choice of the
incumbent.
Next we look at the equilibrium policy outcomes under the incumbent and compare these with the
efficient ones.
Proposition 3. When campaigns are informative about the opponent’s executive competence then
investment in the risky policy is too low (fear of failure) for low p and too high (gambling on
success) for large p.
The first part of the proposition reveals that the introduction of informative campaigns does not
resolve the problem of under-investment in risk when the a priori competence of politicians is low.
To demonstrate, consider the case where, for low p, there is nevertheless a high correlation between
the opponent’s campaigning ability and her executive competence. In this case the opponent’s best
response when the incumbent plays safe is to run a risky campaign. The incumbent’s initial choice
is optimal: she anticipates the opponent’s response and, moreover, that he will fail to convince
voters of his competence. Thus, strategic interaction between the incumbent and her opponent
reinforces “fear of failure” (an inefficiently low level of reform)
The second part of the proposition establishes that informative campaigns can also reinforce incen-
tives to “gamble on success” thus inducing an inefficiently high level of reform. The result follows
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directly from previous ones. As shown in Proposition 2, the efficient level of risk taking is lower
when campaigns are informative and yet the incumbent is incentivized to take more risks. It follows
that investment in the risky policy will be too high.
Indeed, a straightforward comparison reveals that inefficiently high levels of risk are more prevalent
when campaigns are informative than when they are not. As an illustration, and returning to our
bridge building parable, note that, as a consequence of proposition 2, there are situations where the
voter would prefer the incumbent to build the bridge when the opponent’s campaign is informative
and that he refrain from doing so when it is not. Suppose that the incumbent acts according to
the voter’s wish to not build the bridge. Should the opponent play safe then the voter is unable
to distinguish between them. In fact (for large p) the opponent’s best response to safe play by
the incumbent is seize the opportunity of impressing the voter with his campaign. Should he be
successful when doing so then, absent any evidence to the contrary, the voter is persuaded that he
is in fact the better choice for office. Anticipating this, a sequentially rational incumbent will (for
high p) not play safe. The problem for the voter is that she cannot commit to ignore information
about the opponent’s ability. 11
With informative campaigns reform is then either too high or too low, relative to an efficient
benchmark. Moreover, a qualitative welfare comparison between a world in which the opponent can
influence voters’ beliefs about her competence with one where she cannot reveals that, in the former
case, inefficiencies are larger. This implies that strategic interaction between an incumbent and
opponent, in an environment where the voter can learn about the latter, exacerbates implementation
of inefficient policies.
11A plausible real world example of our equilibrium is the 2010 British general election discussed earlier. As we
have seen, live televised debates, used for the first time in April 2010, allowed the British electorate to update their
beliefs about the executive ability of the Prime Minister’s opponents. In our model, the anticipation that voters do
so can have an (endogenous) impact on policy choice resulting in inefficiencies. Consider the last act of the outgoing
parliament that banned the drug mephedrone with severe penalties imposed on its sale. It was passed on April 7,
2010, and came into force just one day after the first televised leader debate (on April 15th). The ban was imposed
following the death of two teenagers on March 15, 2010 who, according to police reports, had taken the drug. The
ban led to the resignation of a senior member, Eric Carlin, from the UK’s Advisory Council on the Misuse of Drugs
(ACMD)–an independent panel of experts that advises government on drug-related issues. A scathing editorial in the
medical journal The Lancet noted several key concerns and “documented the very scanty evidence on mephedrone,
including the absence of a direct causal link between the reported deaths and the drug.” The editorial went on to say
that “the events surrounding the ACMD signal a disappointing finale to the government’s relationship with science.
Politics has been allowed to contaminate scientific processes and the advice that underpins policy.” (Toxicology tests
later revealed there were no mephedrone traces in the blood of the two deceased teenagers). The example does not
fit the exact timing of our model: the outcomes of the ban were not realised prior to the election. Moreover, we
cannot say, on the basis of our model, that the ban would not have been imposed without informative campaigns.
Nevertheless, the example illustrates how inefficient policy choices are made more likely with an impending and
informative opposition campaign.
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While the result can plausibly explain real world examples, it does not imply that informative
campaigns are bad. Voters benefit from the information provided by the opponent as they are
able to make a more informed decision. Moreover, even unwanted reforms (such as in our bridge-
building parable) yield social returns that are due to learning. This suggests that a fuller welfare
comparison is in order. Thus, in the following result, we explore the overall welfare impact of
introducing informative campaigns.
Proposition 4. Starting from a position with no informative campaigns (ph = p), their introduc-
tion can decrease voter welfare. The welfare loss from an informative campaign is monotonically
decreasing in ph.
As we have seen, even when ph is small, the information available to voters from an opponent’s
campaign can affect the strategic choice of policy by the incumbent. Specifically, he may then be
more willing to implement the risky policy. Thus even small amounts of information can exacerbate
“gambling on success.” Of course, the learning value of such information is small also. It follows
that the overall welfare effect of informative campaigns can be negative. As ph increases, the fact
that the voter is able to make a more informed choice when campaigns are informative compensates
for these unintended policy consequences. So if campaigns are sufficiently informative their impact
on welfare is positive.
In sum, we have seen that information about an opponent’s executive competence increases the
incumbent’s incentive to choose risky policies and can exacerbate “gambling on success.” In equi-
librium, and as in the case without informative campaigns, a voter will perceive reform to either
be too high or too low. Moreover, the introduction of informative campaigns that allow voters to
infer, albeit very imperfectly, an opponent’s competence can have negative consequences. This is
due to the indirect effect of such campaigns on the incumbent’s policy choice.
6. Robustness Checks
In this section we consider the robustness of our key insight that informative campaigns can have an
effect on the policy choices of incumbents, reinforcing electoral incentives to under and over-invest
in risky policies.
6.1. Endogenous choice of x. A possible criticism of our model is that the equilibria we study
may be suboptimal. Until now we fixed x, the retention probability when the voter is indifferent.
Endogenising her choice of x allows us, instead, to study the best possible equilibrium from the
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voter’s perspective. We find that, even in this (somewhat optimistic) optimal world, our core
insights remain.
Proposition 5. When campaigns are uninformative, the efficient level of reform is attained under
an optimal retention rule. By contrast, when campaigns are informative the voter can prevent “fear
of failure” but is unable to prevent “gambling on success.”
The first part of the result shows that in the absence of information about the opponent, the voter
can use her retention rule to perfectly align the incumbent’s incentives with her own. The intuition
for this result is straightforward. When there is no information about the opponent and the
incumbent’s risk-taking is excessive relative to the efficient benchmark, the voter would prefer that
he plays safe and so should reward him when he does. Of course, since the voter is indifferent after
safe is played she can choose any x. Specifically, choosing x = 1 eliminates the incumbent’s incentive
to engage in excessive first-period reform. Following the same logic, whenever the incumbent has
an incentive to shy away from implementing reform (because of her fear of failure) the optimal
rule entails x = 0. Then, the incumbent cannot be reelected unless he implements reform. We see
that an optimal retrospective voting strategy attains the efficient outcome so long as campaigns
are uninformative.
The features of the optimal rule are worth noting. The best rule does not treat the incumbent
and opponent equally although, from the voter’s perspective, they are identical with respect to
their expected competence. In fact, the optimal rule discriminates either in favour or against the
incumbent depending on the circumstances.
The second part of the proposition states that efficiency is not attained even under an optimal rule
when campaigns are informative. In fact, whereas the level of risk is never too low (there is no
fear of failure) it may be too high. Fear of failure is eradicated as (when p < 1/2) the optimal
rule has the incumbent reelected only when he takes the risky option and is successful. However,
although in the absence of an informative campaign the optimal retention rule eradicates gambling
on success, this is no longer the case when campaigns are informative. It is never rational to retain
an incumbent who plays safe when an opponent runs a successful campaign and, anticipating this,
an incumbent will not do so. In sum, even in the best possible equilibrium (from the voter’s
perspective) the incumbent will over-invest in reform (gamble on success).
6.2. Analysis for x = 0 and x = 1. As a further robustness check, we explore whether our results
hold in the extreme cases when x = 1 and x = 0. In the former case, the voter has an extreme bias
19
non infinf
1
r
p
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
x = 1
non inf
inf
1
r
p
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
x = 0
Figure 4. Informative Campaigns in the Presence of Incumbency (Dis)Advantage.
Here pH = p0.3 and ph = p0.7. Reform is either too low or too high when there is an
incumbency advantage (x = 1). When there is an incumbency disadvantage (x = 0)reform
is always too high irrespective of whether the opponent’s campaign is informative or not.
in favor of the incumbent so that she always reelects him when indifferent between the candidates.
In the latter case, the voter has an extreme bias so that she never reelects him under the same set
of circumstances. The effects are illustrated in the left-hand panel of Figure 4.
In the absence of informative campaigns, an incumbent who is advantaged (x = 1) has no incentive
to implement reform. Unsurprisingly, reform is always too low in this case. When campaigns are
informative, the opponent will always choose a risky campaign in order to influence voter beliefs.
Anticipating this, and following our earlier logic, the opponent is more likely to choose risky than
in the absence of such information and, as shown in the left-hand panel of Figure 6, risk-taking
may exceed the desired level. The result starkly illustrates the impact of informative campaigns on
the incumbent’s incentives.
In the case when x = 0, the incumbent can only be elected when taking the risky option. He will
do so irrespective of how informative the opponent’s campaign. The result is illustrated in the right
hand panel.
In sum, only in the limited case (x = 0) do we find that the introduction of informative campaigns
does not change the incumbent’s incentives.12
12A related concern, is that our results may hinge upon a non-robust indifference from the voter’s perspective with
respect to the second period policies. This core feature of the Barro (1973) and Ferejohn (1986) models, in which the
voter is strictly indifferent between her actions under all circumstances, has been subject to criticism. Indeed both
Fearon (1999) and Besley (2006) have shown that, in those models, a small difference to voter payoffs will lead the
incumbent’s incentive scheme to unravel. While indifference also arises here, albeit only under some circumstances,
our results do not hinge upon this. Straightforwardly, a small change to the primitives of our model involving a
higher (lower) payoff to the voter when the incumbent (opponent) implements the safe policy in the second period
has the same first period policy consequences as an incumbency bias (x = 0, 1) as studied here.
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6.3. The Incumbent Can Campaign. We have supposed that the voter can only learn about
the incumbent via his track record. How, if at all, do our results change when allowing for an
informative campaign by a political opponent? We can show that our core results hold. While
suppressing the main details, we provide a brief overview.
It is immediate that our central findings survive when the incumbent can engage in campaigning
that is costless to the voter for some range of parameters. In particular, if the campaign of the
incumbent is less informative than that of the opponent, as appears to have been the case in our
motivating example depicted in Figure 1, then for high p the incumbent will overinvest in reform.
The assumption is not unrealistic. Since the incumbent has had a term in office, one might assume
that the voter will discount her campaign promises in greater measure than she would those of his
opponent. 13
Going further, we might suppose that the incumbent has access to the same campaign technology as
his opponent and that, in line with our key assumptions, his campaign influences voter beliefs only
when he has not implemented the risky policy in the first period (i.e. when no information about
his competence has been revealed). A conjecture is that this would reduce over-experimentation
and indeed straightforward analysis reveals that this is indeed so. Nevertheless, we find that the
key qualitative predictions of our analysis survive. Although there is less reform in the first period
when the incumbent can campaign after implementing the safe policy, we still observe both under
and over investment for low and high values of p respectively. These results are easily proved when
considering the simultaneous choice of campaign strategy, but extend to a world with different
sequencing.14
7. Conclusion
We studied an environment in which a voter influences an incumbent’s policy choice via her reten-
tion rule. In our multi-arm bandit setting, certain policies (which we refer to as risky or reform
ones) allow voters to learn about an incumbent’s executive abilities. The novelty in our setting
involves information that stems from an opponent’s campaign that is correlated (albeit, relatively
weakly) with his own executive ability. A key result is that such campaigns exacerbate inefficient
implementation of reforms by an incumbent who thereby showcases her talent. Our result contrasts
13Relatedly, as noted earlier, there is a large empirical evidence starting with Jacobson (1978) that shows incumbent’s
campaign spending is less effective than opponent spending.
14Details available upon request. Further robustness checks with respect to changes in our model primitives are
discussed in Appendix A.
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with expectations when agents take risk and are compensated by a salary that increases linearly in
the agent’s reputation. Then, as shown by Holstrom (1999), an agent who does not know his own
ability under-invests in risky projects. The contrast is due to the coarseness of the agent’s reward
structure. In our environment he is either retained in office or replaced. Our key results show
that inefficiencies stemming from the coarse retention rule are exacerbated by the role of an oppo-
nent. Our central lesson is that incumbent’s place too much emphasis on what is learned through
implementing policy and not enough on the voter’s payoff from such policies. A change in the
competitive environment so that voters learn about an opponent’s abilities (such as, for example,
via the introduction of televised debates) can worsen this situation and the overall welfare effect
can be negative. Our model thus illustrates a trade-off between incentives and learning: Electoral
competition is desirable from a learning prospective but weakens voter control over the incumbent.
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